Abstract:

Goldman (1967) proposed that a subject s knows p if and only if p is appropriately causally connected to s’s believing p. He later on abandoned this theory (Goldman, 1976). The main objection to the theory is that the causal connection required by Goldman is compatible with certain problematic forms of luck (i.e., environmental luck — a subspecies of veritic luck). In this paper we argue that Goldman’s causal theory of knowledge can overcome the luck problem if causation is understood along interventionist lines. We also show that our interventionist version of the causal theory of knowledge only rules out the kind of luck it should (i.e., veritic luck) while it still allows for knowledge involving the kind of luck it should (i.e., evidential luck).

Speaker:

Alexander is a postdoc at the Department of Theoretical Philosophy at the University of Groningen, Netherlands. Before, he was a postdoc at the Düsseldorf Center for Logic and Philosophy of Science (DCLPS) at the University of Düsseldorf, Germany. He obtained his PhD from the University of Düsseldorf and his MA from the University of Salzburg, Austria. His research interests lie in philosophy of science and its intersection with metaphysics and philosophy of mind. He is especially interested in causation and related topics.

For more information, see Alexander's personal website: www.alexandergebharter.com

Aufgrund der Corona-Pandemie werden die Vorträge des Forschungsseminars des Lehrstuhls für Theoretische Philosophie im Sommersemester 2020 per Videokonferenz durchgeführt werden. Bitte melden Sie sich, falls Sie an der Videokonferenz teilnehmen möchten, per Email (christian@phil.hhu.de).