Im Rahmen unseres Philosophischen Kolloquiums laden wir herzlich ein zu einem Vortrag von 

Friederike Moltmann (New York/Paris): Truth Predicates, Truth Bearers and the Variants 

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Zum Vortrag:

Theories of truth have generally focused on true occurring with that-clauses. This talk takes a closer look at predicates of truth (and related notions) when they apply to referential noun phrases. It argues that truth predicates and their variants, predicates of correctness, satisfaction and validity, do not apply to propositions (not even with that-clauses), but to a range of attitudinal and modal objects, objects we refer to as 'claims', 'beliefs', 'judgments', 'demands', 'promises, 'obligations' etc. As such natural language reflects a notion of truth that is primarily a normative notion, which, however, is not action-guiding, but rather constitutive of representational objects. The paper furthermore argues that the predicate 'true' is part of a larger class of satisfaction predicates (satisfied, realized, taken up, etc), whose semantic differences are best accounted for in terms of a truthmaker theory along the lines of Fine's recent truthmaker semantics. Truthmaker semantics also provides a notion of partial content applicable to attitudinal and modal objects, which may exhibit partial correctness, partial satisfaction, and partial validity.

Zur Person:

Friederike Moltmann is research director at the French Centre Nationale de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS) and in recent years visiting researcher at New York University. Her research focuses on the interface between natural language semantics and philosophy (metaphysics, but also philosophy of mind, philosophy of language and philosophy of mathematics).