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BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:-//TYPO3/NONSGML Calendar Base (cal) V1.11.1//EN METHOD:PUBLISH BEGIN:VEVENT UID:www.hhu.de_248_24756 DTSTAMP:20201116T115523 DTSTART:20201201T173000Z DTEND:20201201T191500Z CATEGORIES:Research Seminar Theoretical Philosophy, Forschungsseminar SUMMARY:Prof. Joachim Horvarth (Univ. Bochum): The Myth of Intuitive Expertise (Zoom) DESCRIPTION:Abstract:\r\n\r\nVarious findings from experimental philosophy suggest that intuitive judgments about hypothetical cases are untrustworthy because they are sensitive to irrelevant factors\, such as order of presentation or affective content. The expertise defense tries to counter this challenge with the prima facie plausible claim that professional philosophers possess intuitive expertise for judging hypothetical cases. There are two basic possibilities how the expertise defense could turn out successful: first\, professional philosophers are equally sensitive to irrelevant factors as lay people\, but they are so much better in judging hypothetical cases that this problematic sensitivity does not really matter – call this the ‘master model’ of intuitive expertise; second\, there is no substantial difference between professional philosophers and lay people in their judgments about hypothetical cases\, but the former are much better in resisting the influence of irrelevant factors – call this the ‘immunity model’ of intuitive expertise. Unfortunately\, there is little to no direct evidence that professional philosophers possess intuitive expertise of either the master or the immunity variety. Moreover\, the science of expertise provides indirect evidence against intuitive expertise in philosophy\, given that there is no plausible model how professional philosophers could have acquired such expertise. It might thus be time to leave the expertise defense behind and develop more promising responses to the challenge from experimental philosophy.\r\n\r\nSpeaker: \r\n\r\nJoachim Horvath is Junior-Professor for Metaphilosophy and Experimental Philosophy at the Institute for Philosophy II at Ruhr University Bochum\, where he is also primary investigator of the Emmy Noether Independent Junior Research Group “Experimental Philosophy and the Method of Cases: Theoretical Foundations\, Responses\, and Alternatives (EXTRA)” (funded by the German Research Foundation DFG). He previously held a post-doctoral position at the University of Cologne\, and he was managing director of the German Society for Analytic Philosophy GAP. Horvath’s main areas of research are epistemology\, metaphilosophy\, and experimental philosophy. His work has been published in journals like Mind\, Philosophical Studies\, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research\, Synthese\, and Thought. END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR