Dr. Maria Sekatskaya (Universität Düsseldorf): Event-Causal Libertarianism and the Problem of Discrimination

Datum / Uhrzeit:
05.05.20   /  19:30 - 21:00

Institut für Theoretische Philosophie


My aim is to show that Robert Kane’s naturalistic version of event-causal libertarian-ism faces an ethical problem. First, I will review Kane’s conditions for free will and show that his theory implies what I call 'Principle HM': the necessity of having had enough self-forming actions in the past of a person for this person to qualify as a free and morally responsible agent. After that, I will provide two thought experiments fea-turing agents satisfying all of Kane’s conditions for free will except Principle HM. I will argue that these agents are apparently not different in a morally relevant sense from the agents that are free according to Kane. Therefore, the supporters of Kane’s natu-ralistic version of event-causal libertarianism should either demonstrate that the moral status of these two types of agents is different despite the initial appearance, or accept that HM is not necessary for moral responsibility. 

Maria Sekatskaya is a post-doctoral research fellow at the Heinrich Heine University Duesseldorf, DCLPS. She defended her Ph.D. dissertation and worked as a senior lec-turer at the Saint Petersburg State University (Russia). Maria Sekatskaya was a visiting scholar at the University of Fribourg (Switzerland), University of California, Berkeley (USA) and the University of Mainz. Her main research interests are in philosophy of mind and metaphysics, with a special emphasis on the problems of free will and per-sonal identity.  


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