#### INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE

# Free Will and Causality

September 26-27, 2019, Haus der Universitaet, Schadowplatz 14, 40212 Düsseldorf, Germany

## **Program**

Thursday, September 26

Registration (08.15 - 08.30)

	Room 03.011/012
08.30 – 09.30	Timothy O'Connor (Indiana University): Probabilistic Explanation and Free Will
09.45 – 10.45	John Lemos (Coe College): A Modified Nozickian Model of Free Will
11.00 – 12.00	Nadine Elzein (University of Oxford): Causal explanation and alternative possibilities

#### Lunch Break

#### Parallel Sessions

	Room 03.011/012	Room 01.021
13.30 – 14.15	Alex Kaiserman (University of Oxford): Causation, Reasons-Sensitivity, and Degrees of Free Will	Anne Sophie Meincke (University of Vienna): Towards a Process Ontology of Actions and Agents
14.25 – 15.05	Caroline Touborg (Lund University): The Causal Role of Beliefs about Freedom	Amit Pundik (Tel Aviv University): Factual Agent Causation
15.15 – 16.00	Gunnar Björnsson (Stockholm University): The Unbearable Lightness of Agent Causation	George Stamets (University of Leeds): Powers, Agency, and Freedom

Coffee Break

	Room 03.011/012
16.30 – 17.30	Christian Loew (Umeå University): Doing Otherwise in a Deterministic World

## Friday, September 27

	Room 03.011/012
08.30 – 09.30	Laura Ekstrom (College of William & Mary in Virginia): Indeterminist Free Will
09.45 – 10.45	Alexander Gebharter and Gerhard Schurz (University of Groningen and University of Duesseldorf): Free Will, Control, and the Possibility to Do Otherwise from a Causal Modeler's Perspective
11.00 – 12.00	Hans Briegel (University of Innsbruck & University of Constance): A Stochastic Process Model for Free Agency under Indeterminism

### Lunch Break

#### Parallel Sessions

	Room 03.011/012	Room 02.021
13.30 – 14.15	John Thorp (Western University): Causality and Explanatory Priority: Could the Mind Sometimes Run the Brain?	Mathieu Baril (McGill University): A Case for the Non-Causal Approach to Agency
14.25 – 15.05	Louis Vervoort (School of Advanced Studies, University of Tyumen): Free Will, Causation and Bell's Theorem	Jingbo Hu (University of Sheffield): Is Reasons-Responsiveness Causally Irrelevant?
15.15 – 16.00	Valentin Widmann (University of Innsbruck): Why Agent Causality is Needed for Libertarian Free Will	Artem Besedin (Moscow State University): Attentiveness Requirement for Free Will and Moral Responsibility

## Coffee Break

	Room 03.011/012
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16.30 – 17.30	Maria Sekatskaya and Gerhard Schurz (University of Duesseldorf): Alternative Possibilities and the Meaning of 'Can'
17.45 – 18.45	Sander Beckers (LMU Munich): Causation and the Principle of Alternative Possibilities