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ASSERTIVE AND NON-ASSERTIVE SENTENCES. CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE *ORATIO PERFECTA* IN THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY

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Since logic in the 13th century is focussed on syllogistics as its main subject, textbooks on logic provide us with large and detailed treatments of the proposition as the immediate and constitutive basis of the syllogism. In the present paper I will give a survey of these treatments and pay special attention to a certain side-issue, namely to non-assertive sentences and to some difficulties concerning their classification. I will focus on William of Sherwood's approach to the subject and compare it with the conceptions of Roger Bacon, Peter of Spain and Lambert of Lagny,[1] who are the authors of the three main logic compendia besides William of Sherwood's in the thirteenth century.

I. «*Enuntiatio*» and «*propositio*»

Williams's treatment of the proposition in the *Introductiones* begins with a terminological distinction between *enuntiatio* and *propositio*.[2] Both are identical as such (*secundum rem*), but they differ with regard to their signification: An *enuntiatio* signifies something absolutely, while a *propositio* signifies something with respect to something different. The fact that a *propositio* signifies something with respect to something different becomes obvious from the word «propositio» itself. With regard to its etymology «propositio» means «positio pro». And since the *propositio* is an *enuntiatio* in its special function as a premise within a syllogism, William states that a

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[1] Lambert of Lagny has been taken for Lambert of Auxerre until recent times. Cf. P. SCHULTESS, R. IMBACH, *Die Philosophie im lateinischen Mittelalter*, Zürich, Artemis & Winkler, 1996, p. 508. Therefore referring to LAMBERTO D'AUXERRE, *Logica*, ed. F. Alessio, Firenze, La Nuova Italia Editrice, 1971, I actually mean the logic of Lambert of Lagny.

[2] WILLIAM OF SHERWOOD, *Introductiones in logicam*, ed. H. Brands, Ch. Kann, Hamburg, Meiner, 1995 (= *Introductiones*), p. 2-4.

proposition is a «positio [...] pro conclusione concludenda» – something assumed in order to obtain a conclusion.[3]

William traces back his use of *enuntiatio* and *propositio* to a Boethian distinction that remained relevant throughout the Middle Ages. Basically, «enuntiatio» and «propositio» are synonyms, as both stand for a sentence signifying something true or false (*oratio verum falsumve significans*).[4] «Propositio», however, can receive the additional meaning of a *thesis* or premise, especially the first premise of a syllogism.[5] It should be noted here that William is well aware of the difference between *propositio* and *enuntiatio*, but he does not keep up this distinction consistently. In his treatment of the modal proposition, for example, he often uses the term «propositio», where – according to his distinction – we would expect «enuntiatio».[6] For the sake of simplicity, in the present survey I will use «proposition» for «enuntiatio» and «propositio» alike. However, we have to avoid here the modern understanding of proposition, or propositional content, as what is asserted or what is expressed by a sentence. When William speaks of the signification not only of an *enuntiatio* but also of a *propositio*, he obviously regards both as concrete sets of words, or, as Nuchelmans says, a «statement-making utterance».[7]

II. *Types of sentences*

In the initial paragraphs of his *Introductiones* William of Sherwood works out a graduated division first of the sentence or *oratio* in general and then of the *enuntiatio* or *propositio*.[8] As the proposition is a result of a division of the sentence, a comprehensive understanding of the proposition has to be based on an understanding of the sentence. A sentence is defined as a complex utterance significant by convention. Parts of the sentence are significant separately. The sentences can be divided into the complete (*per-*

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[3] *Ibid.*, p. 2,25 sq.

[4] BOETHIUS, *In librum Aristotelis de interpretatione* II, MPL 64, 454D: «Est enuntiatio vox significativa verum falsumque significans». ID., *De differentiis topicis*, MPL 64, 1174B: «Propositio est oratio verum falsumve significans [...]».

[5] In this sense the term already occurs in CICERO, *De inventione* I, 59. Cf. also QUINTILIANUS, *Institutiones oratoriae* V, 14, 24.

[6] WILLIAM OF SHERWOOD, *Introductiones* cit., p. 32-36.

[7] G. NUCHELMANS, *Theories of the proposition*, Amsterdam, North-Holland Publishing Company, 1973, p. 165.

[8] WILLIAM OF SHERWOOD, *Introductiones* cit., p. 8 sqq. For the translation of «oratio» with «sentence» cf. *ibid.*, p. 226, note 7.

fecta) and the incomplete (*imperfecta*). Complete sentences are those that produce a complete thought in the hearer's mind, for example «homo est albus». Incomplete sentences are those that produce an incomplete thought in the hearer's mind, for example «homo albus». The notion of a complete thought is widely used in the explanations of the complete sentence given by medieval logic texts. In most cases, for example in Peter of Spain and in Lambert of Lagny, we read of a *perfectus sensus* that is established by the complete sentence.[9] William uses the phrase «perfectum intellectum constituit in animo audientis», while Lambert even stresses the aspect of complete understanding by the phrase «qua audita quiescit animus auditoris».[10] Indeed, it is worth pointing out that the distinction made here between the two subclasses of the sentences is less a grammatical or syntactical distinction, as we would expect, but rather a semantical or epistemological distinction.

Subsequently, William's *Introductiones* treat a subdivision of the complete sentence into (1) the indicative sentence, which is produced by the indicative mood, e.g. «a man is running» (*homo currit*), (2) the imperative or entreating sentence, which is produced by the imperative or entreating mood, e.g. «come to read» (*veni lectum*), (3) the optative sentence, e.g. «if only I were reading» (*utinam legerem*), (4) the conjunctive sentence, e.g. «when (because, though) I am reading» (*cum legam*), (5) the infinitive sentence, e.g. «that Socrates is reading» (*Socratem legere*) (known as the accusative-infinitive-phrase which often occurs as a clause in indirect discourse), and, finally, (6) the interrogative sentence, e.g. «which man is running?» (*quis homo currit?*).[11] Among these types only the indicative sentence signifies the true and the false, or, to put it in different terms, is a bearer of truth values. Therefore, only the indicative sentence can be called a proposition. And, furthermore, since logic teaches how to speak truly and since the logician is concerned with language under the perspective of truth and falsity, logic at first glance can be restricted to the indicative sentence, i.e. the proposition, which is subject of further divisions relevant for logical purposes.

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[9] PETER OF SPAIN, *Tractatus*, ed. L. M. de Rijk, Assen, Van Gorcum, 1972, p. 3,15; LAMBERTO D'AUXERRE, *Logica* cit., p. 11.

[10] WILLIAM OF SHERWOOD, *Introductiones* cit., p. 10,99 sq.; LAMBERTO D'AUXERRE, *Logica* cit., p. 11.

[11] WILLIAM OF SHERWOOD, *Introductiones* cit., p. 10,102-108; cf. PETER OF SPAIN, *Tractatus* cit., p. 3,18-20; LAMBERTO D'AUXERRE, *Logica* cit., p. 11 sq.; ROGER BACON, *Summule dialectices* («Opera hactenus inedita Rogeri Baconi», XV), ed. R. Steele, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1940, p. 240 sq.

First, however, I will take a closer look at the division of the *oratio perfecta*, especially at the different types of non-assertive sentences in William's *Introductiones* and in the other important compendia of logic in the 13th century mentioned above, namely those of Roger Bacon, Peter of Spain and Lambert of Lagny. This division of the *oratio perfecta* essentially goes back to Boethius,[12] whose distinctions are followed most closely by Lambert of Lagny. In the other textbooks the enumerations of non-assertive sentences are similar, but differ in significant details. These differences are shown in the following table, and I will comment on the columns from left to right. The *oratio indicativa* is treated by all authors in a similar manner, even down to particular examples. Two points, however, are worth mentioning here, firstly, that Boethius had not called this type «indicativa», but «enuntiativa», and secondly, that Roger Bacon subdivides the *oratio indicativa* into an *oratio enuntiativa* and into an *oratio interrogativa*. The *oratio interrogativa* represents a class of its own in William and Lambert and is omitted in Peter. The *oratio vocativa* is omitted by William and Peter and in Roger it is reduced to the *oratio imperativa*. The *oratio imperativa* is treated in the same manner by all authors. The *oratio deprecativa* is omitted only by Peter, but the other authors do not regard it as a class of its own: Roger states that the *oratio deprecativa* is usually (*communiter*) reduced to the *oratio imperativa* – just the manner it is also treated by William – and adds that it is reduced to the *oratio optativa* by Boethius – just the manner it is also treated by Lambert. Again the *oratio optativa* is treated by all authors in the same manner. The two non-Boethian types represented by the last two columns of the table will be examined in the next paragraph.

III. *Kinds of speech and moods of the verb*

The fact that the authors do not strictly confine themselves to the Boethian division of the *oratio perfecta* is neither surprising nor in itself a point of criticism, since Boethius' divison is explicitly aimed at representing a version which is restricted as far as possible (*augustissima divisio*). The *Introductiones Montane Minores* stress the fact that the Boethian *augustissima divisio* does not comprehend all kinds of sentences, and they refer to

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[12] BOETHIUS, *De syllogismo categorico*, MPL 64, 797B-C. Similar divisions occur in the subsequent tradition, especially in treatises of the 11th and 12th centuries; cf. L. M. DE RIJK, *Logica Modernorum* II-2, Assen, Van Gorcum, 1967, p. 151,28; 467,25.

oratio perfecta

	indicativa	interrogativa	vocativa	imperativa	deprecativa	optativa	coniunctiva	infinitiva
William of Sherwood	indicativa «homo currit»	interrogativa «quis homo currit?»		imperativa «veni lectum»	deprecativa ↓	optativa «utinam legerem»	coniunctiva «cum legam»	infinitiva «Socratem legere»
Lambert of Lagny / Boethius	indicativa/enuntiativa «Sortes ambulat»	interrogativa «putasne anima est immortalis?»	vocativa «adesto mihi Deus»	imperativa «fac ignem»	deprecativa ↑ optativa	optativa «utinam essem bonus clericus»		
Peter of Spain	indicativa «homo currit»			imperativa «fac ignem»		optativa «utinam essem bonus clericus»	subiunctiva «si veneris ad me, dabo tibi equum»	
Roger Bacon	indicativa «homo currit» / enuntiativa «anima immortalis est» — interrogativa «putasne animal immortale esse?»		vocativa «adesto mihi Deus» →	imperativa «fac ignem»	deprecativa «faciat deus» → «miserere mei Deus» (communiter → imperativa; secundum Boethium → optativa)	optativa «utinam essem bonus clericus»		

Boethian types   non-Boethian types

Apuleius who enumerates no less than eighteen kinds of sentences.[13] Nevertheless, the two non-Boethian subclasses of the *oratio perfecta*, namely the *oratio coniunctiva* and the *oratio infinitiva* offered by William, are criticized by Nuchelmans.[14] According to Nuchelman's investigation, which concentrates on the period between the middle of the 12th century and the beginning of the 13th century, we usually find the Boethian division into five species of the complete sentence, namely those that are repeated by Lambert of Lagny. But, as Nuchelmans adds, «it is noteworthy that we also meet with passages in which the division of the kinds of speech is obviously confused with the classification of the moods of the verb: the *oratio interrogativa* is omitted and to the *oratio indicativa, imperativa, deprecativa,* and *optativa* an *oratio coniunctiva* is added, and even an *oratio infinitiva*». Nuchelmans continues with a far-reaching observation: «This confusion of kinds of speech and utterances in different moods of the verb was continued by such influential authors as William of Sherwood and Peter of Spain in the thirteenth century, and this fact no doubt contributed to the eventual atrophy of such philosophical inquiry into the nature and classification of kinds of speech as there had been in the past».

Roger Bacon – as the only one among our 13th century-authors – already reflects on the problem emphasized by Nuchelmans. Roger comments on reasons why, in his opinion, Boethius had not assumed an *oratio coniunctiva*: The *oratio coniunctiva* by itself does not represent an *oratio* – of course «perfecta» (in the sense of a complete thought) should be added – but only in connection with another verb.[15] This connection with another verb means combining the *oratio coniunctiva*, which, in William's case, is just the subordinate clause «cum legam», with a principal clause. The result, according to Roger, could be the example «si venias ad me, nihil tibi dabo». A quite similar example is given by Peter as an *oratio subiunctiva*, «si veneris ad me, dabo tibi equum». The terms «coniunctiva» and «subiunctiva» are synonyms in our context, since both mean the conjunctive mood of the verb. The fact that William presents a subordinate clause in the conjunctive mood as an example of an *oratio coniunctiva*, while Peter presents a complex sentence including a subordinate and a principal clause, points towards a difficulty considered by Roger which prevents him from

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[13] Cf. L. M. DE RIJK, *Logica Modernorum* II-2 cit., p. 18,17-20. APULEIUS, *Peri hermeneias* (Opera III), ed. P. Thomas, Stuttgart, Teubner, 1970, p. 176,5-12.

[14] G. NUCHELMANS, *Theories of the proposition* cit., p. 166.

[15] ROGER BACON, *Summule dialectices* cit., p. 241: «Conjunctivam oracionem non ponit Boecius, quia non facit oracionem per se, set cum alio verbo cui subjungitur, et ideo magis debet denominari ab alio verbo, ut 'si venias ad me nichil tibi dabo' indicativa est, et ideo conjunctiva oracio, per se sumpta, sub oracione inperfecta continetur».

accepting non-Boethian examples like William and Peter: Either (William's case) the *oratio coniunctiva/subiunctiva* is a subordinate clause which then is not a complete sentence (*oratio perfecta*) and, therefore, does not fall within our classification, or (Peter's case) the *oratio coniunctiva/subiunctiva* is a complete sentence, namely a *propositio hypothetica*. In the latter case the example should not be named and classified with respect to the verb in the subordinate clause, but with respect to the verb in the principal clause. The verb in the principal clause, however, does not stand in the conjunctive mood but rather in the indicative mood with the result that the *propositio hypothetica* must be subsumed under the *oratio indicativa*. Similar reasons prevent William's *oratio infinitiva* from being an appropriate subclass of the complete sentence.

Up to this point Nuchelman's criticism of the non-Boethian examples of the complete sentence which confuse the – correct – classification with regard to «kinds of speech» with the – mistaken – classification with regard to «moods of the verb» has to be confirmed. While the notion of an *oratio indicativa* as corresponding to that of an *oratio coniunctiva/subiunctiva* apparently refers to the mood of the verb, the same notion corresponding to that of an *oratio interrogativa* seems to indicate a kind of speech. This implies some kind of ambiguity of the notion of «oratio indicativa» – chiefly in William's classification. The notion of «oratio indicativa» as referring to the mood of the verb allows Roger Bacon to use it as an generic term for the *oratio enuntiativa* and the *oratio interrogativa* both of which are intended as different kinds of speech while sharing the indicative mood of the verb. To sum up, the problem of kinds of speech and moods of the verb at least partially rests upon the fact that authors in the 13th century deviate from the predominant usage in the 12th century and tend to replace the Boethian notion of an *oratio enuntiativa* by the notion of an *oratio indicativa*. This leads to confusion, since the latter suggests a mood of the verb while the former signifies a kind of speech.

IV. *Distinctions of the proposition*

Before I continue with questions of classification of non-assertive language, I will first refer to the proposition as that type of sentences which is of main interest from a logical point of view. What is William's way of treating the proposition? There are two different approaches. The first can be identified with the well-known scholastic methodology of *definitio* and *divisio* according to which William's initial explanation of *propositio* and *enuntiatio* in the *Introductiones* is followed by a detailed division, as al-

ready mentioned. The second approach is based on an equally well-known methodological principle presented by William in the very beginning of his *Syncategoremata*: In order to obtain an understanding of something, we are dependent on analysis.[16] Both approaches have in common that they are concerned with parts of the proposition, but with parts of different kinds, namely subjective parts and integral parts.[17] Integral parts, in general, are those that constitute something as a whole or in its completeness. The integral parts of the proposition are subject and predicate.[18] Subjective parts in contrast are those which constitute the whole in its variety or community (*in sua communitate*). The subjective parts of the proposition are the different kinds or types into which the proposition can be divided extensionally.

I confine myself to William's division of the proposition into subjective parts. The first step of this division is a twofold one: (1) A division according to the nature of its subject or predicate (*penes naturam subiecti vel predicati*), namely the distinction of *enuntiatio una* and *plures* which will be explained later, and (2) a division according to its substance (*penes substantiam*). With respect to their substance, propositions are divided into the categorical and the hypothetical. It is worth mentioning here that Peter's example of an *oratio subiunctiva* «si veneris ad me, dabo tibi equum» could be subsumed here, since it is an *enuntiatio hypothetica* and, with regard to its principal clause, it is an *enuntiatio indicativa* as already pointed out. The same applies to William's *oratio coniunctiva* «cum legam» if it were syntactically completed by means of a principal clause.[19]

The categorical proposition is further subdivided (1) with respect to its quality into the affirmative and the negative propositions and (2) with respect to its quantity into the singular, particular, indefinite and universal propositions. Concerning the quality one could argue that hypothetical propositions are affirmative or negative as well. Nevertheless, we should note that our authors explicitly or implicitly assume quality as a distinction

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[16] WɪLLɪAM ᴏF SʜᴇRWᴏᴏD, *Syncategoremata*, ed. J. R. O'Donnell, «Medieval Studies», 3, 1941, p. 46-93 [48]: «Quia ad cognitionem alicujus oportet cognoscere suas partes; ideo ut plene cognoscatur enuntiatio oportet ejus partes cognoscere».

[17] For the division of the proposition into integral and subjective parts cf. WɪLLɪAM ᴏF SʜᴇRᴡᴏᴏD, *Introductiones* cit., p. 10,121 sqq.

[18] The view that the copula were a third part of the *propositio* is rejected by WɪLLɪAM ᴏF SʜᴇRWᴏᴏD, *Introductiones* cit., p. 12,131-135.

[19] Peter's example is an *enuntiatio hypothetica* in the strict sense of an *enuntiatio conditionalis*, while William's example, if it were completed with the result of an *oratio perfecta*, were an *enuntiatio hypothetica* in a broad and unspecific sense, according to which – in the literal sense of «hypothetica» – one sentence is «put under» another.

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of the categorical proposition,[20] which is due to the traditional understanding of affirmation and negation as *compositio* and *divisio*.

Concerning the division of a proposition's quantity we should note that the distinction of the four classes actually results from a threefold division: In a first step the proposition is divided into a singular and a general proposition. The general proposition is again divided into a definite and an indefinite proposition. In a third and final step the definite proposition is divided into a particular and a universal proposition. What is worth mentioning with regard to the particular and the indefinite proposition is the fact that according to William the judgement (*iudicium*) or the mental correlate of both propositions is one and the same. William obviously identifies the truth-conditions of the particular and the indefinite proposition, which, accordingly, can be replaced by each other in argumentation *salva veritate*.

I now return to the division of the proposition with respect to the nature of the subject and the predicate, namely the single and the multiple proposition (*enuntiatio una* and *plures*) mentioned above. What is meant here is not the distinction between an unambiguous and an ambiguous proposition. Rather, we are confronted with a syntactical distinction. When William says that a single proposition occurs when one thing is predicated of one thing, he means that it consists of one subject term and one predicate term. In contrast, when William says that a multiple proposition occurs when one thing is predicated of many things, or many of one, or many of many, he speaks about propositions with a complex subject and/or a complex predicate, and proposes three different manners a multiple proposition can be constructed.

William's distinction of single and multiple propositions in the *Introductiones* shows certain similarities to a passage in his *Syncategoremata* where he treats the copulative conjunction «et» which according to Priscianus is said to signify or indicate being together (*simul esse*).[21] The being together indicated by «et», as William explains, is that of two predicates in one subject, or of two subjects in one predicate, or of two predicates in two subjects or *vice versa*. This distinction of four cases can be read as an explanation of the three different manners in which a multiple proposition can be constructed according to the *Introductiones*. What could be examples of the four types? Two predicates and one subject occur in «Sortes dis-

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[20] PᴇTᴇR ᴏF SᴘAɪN, *Tractatus* cit., p. 5,3 sq.; LᴀMBᴇRTᴏ ᴅ'AᴜXᴇRRᴇ, *Logica* cit., p. 13; WɪLLɪAM ᴏF SʜᴇRWᴏᴏD, *Introductiones* cit., p. 12,152 sqq.

[21] WɪLLɪAM ᴏF SʜᴇRWᴏᴏD, *Introductiones* cit., p. 12,136-140; Iᴅ., *Syncategoremata* cit., p. 84.

putat et ambulat». Two subjects and one predicate occur in «Sortes et Plato disputant». Two subjects and two predicates occur in «Sortes et Plato disputant et ambulant». Here we can say that the being together indicated by «et» is that of two predicates in two subjects. The same example, however, seems to cover the *vice versa*-case, since it can be regarded in both ways, either as two predicates in two subjects or as two subjects in two predicates. These two versions do not represent alternative types of syntactically different propositions but rather two manners of regarding one and the same type in two different ways of which the *vice versa*-case seems to be added just for the sake of symmetry. This interpretation allows to identify at first glance four modes of syntactical function of «et» in the *Syncategoremata* with the three types of multiple propositions in the *Introductiones*.

V. *Proposition and question*

The distinction of *enuntiatio una* and *plures* occurs again in William's treatise on fallacies, in which paralogisms arising from more than one question regarded as one are treated.[22] In his initial division of the complete sentence (*oratio perfecta*) William ruled out the *oratio interrogativa*, i.e. the *interrogatio* or *questio*, as not being a subject of interest for logical purposes since it is not a bearer of truth or falsity. Accordingly, he contrasted the *oratio interrogativa* like the other types of non-assertive sentences with the *oratio indicativa* and the proposition respectively. In the context of the fallacies *secundum plures interrogationes ut unam*, however, William points out that a question and a proposition are one and the same here (*idem est hic interrogatio et propositio*), albeit in different regards. A sentence may function as a question prior to the construction of a syllogism, and it is a proposition when it occurs within a syllogism. A fallacy arises when a multiple proposition is regarded as a single proposition, that is if it is answered by a single reply. William's example is «are Socrates and Plato at home?» (*suntne Socrates and Plato domi?*), when the one has gone out and the other has not. If the question is answered in the affirmative, then, for instance, Socrates who is not at home is said to be at home, and Plato who is at home is said to be not at home.

A detailed discussion of this fallacy is not required here. The point of interest in the present context is William's identification of *propositio* and

interrogatio or *questio*. We should note that medieval logicians use the term «questio» in two different meanings. For instance, Garlandus Compotista makes the distinction between (1) a *questio per quam queritur* and (2) a *questio de qua queritur*.[23] While the first one is a question in the usual sense of the term, the second is a questionable or doubtful proposition that does not have the form of a question – in Garlandus' terms «in qua non est questionis signum». Peter of Spain also gives a terminological introduction of a *questio* in the meaning of Garlandus' *questio de qua queritur*, i.e. a doubtful proposition (*propositio dubitabilis*).[24] Moreover, for Peter *enuntiatio*, *propositio*, *interrogatio* and *conclusio* are one and the same, namely versions of the *oratio indicativa*: «Enuntiatio est oratio indicativa secundum quod significat res esse vel non esse. Propositio est oratio indicativa alterius probativa. Interrogatio est oratio indicativa sub modo interrogandi sumpta. Conclusio est oratio indicativa medio vel mediis approbata».[25] The four types are one and the same with regard to their substance (*sunt idem substantia*), but they differ in genuine respects (*differunt autem propriis rationibus*). In view of this substantial identity of the *oratio indicativa* and the *oratio interrogativa* in Peter's classification of the *oratio perfecta* the *oratio interrogativa* is presumably not omitted accidentally, but is rather integrated into the *oratio indicativa*. Otherwise, if Peter had assumed the *oratio interrogativa* as a separate type, he should have added subclasses of the *oratio perfecta* for *enuntiatio*, *propositio* and *conclusio* alike.

While we accept that the question is just a certain mode in which a proposition may occur, we have to ask, however, whether this is valid for all questions. William points out in his analysis of the *plures interrogationes ut unam*-fallacy that *questio* and *propositio* are one and the same *here* (*hic*). Again: Is this always the case? Garlandus Compotista, as mentioned earlier, describes a *questio de qua queritur*, i.e. the doubtful proposition, as a proposition «in qua non est questionis signum».[26] What is a *questionis signum*? Obviously, it is not a question mark, but rather a sign as it occurs in William's example «suntne Socrates et Plato domi?».[27] Without the *questionis signum* «ne» we have a proposition, namely «sunt Socrates et Plato domi» – admittedly in an unusual order of words. So we can say: With a

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[22] WILLIAM OF SHERWOOD, *Introductiones* cit., p. 218 sqq. For more on this kind of paralogisms, cf. in this volume A. TABARRONI's article "Plures interrogationes": *a Fallacy in Question?*

[23] GARLANDUS COMPOTISTA, *Dialectica*, ed. L. M. de Rijk, Assen, Van Gorcum, 1959, p. 90,1-7.

[24] PETER OF SPAIN, *Tractatus* cit., p. 55,21 sq.

[25] *Ibid.*, p. 177,7-10; cf. p. 58,14-59,5. Cf. also L. M. DE RIJK, *Logica Modernorum* II-1, Assen, Van Gorcum, 1967, p. 472.

[26] GARLANDUS COMPOTISTA, *Dialectica*, p. 90,3.

[27] For the *questionis signa* or *note dubitationis* cf. L. M. DE RIJK, *Logica Modernorum* II-1 cit., p. 472: «Sunt autem iste tres dictiones 'an', 'ne', 'utrum' note dubitationis».

questionis signum it is a question and without that *signum* it is not a question in the usual sense, but rather a proposition. More difficult is Lambert's example of an *oratio interrogativa* in our table: «putasne anima est immortalis?». If the sign «ne» were removed, the result would be the grammatically incorrect proposition «putas anima est immortalis». Probably, this was the reason for Roger Bacon to give a different example, «putasne animal immortale esse?», which – without the *questionis signum* – is a grammically correct proposition. Difficulties again appear with William's example of the *oratio interrogativa* «quis homo currit?». Since there is no corresponding proposition or no *questionis signum* that could be removed, our result is: Every proposition can be transformed into an interrogative sentence, but not *vice versa*, i.e. not every question can be transformed into a proposition. This accounts for William's remark concerning the *plures interrogationes ut unam*-fallacy that *questio* and *propositio* are one and the same *here*.

Another approach to the missing symmetry would be: Since propositions are defined as sentences signifying the true or the false we may assume that there are corresponding questions asking for «true» or «false» and accordingly for affirmation or negation. But obviously not all questions ask for affirmation or negation. While the *questio dialetica* «suntne Plato et Sortes domi?» asks for affirmation or negation, the *questio disciplinalis* «quis homo currit?» neither asks for affirmation or negation (rather, it asks for a person) nor corresponds to a proposition.[28] This may have induced William to insert the word «hic» in the case in which question and proposition are actually one and the same. The fact, however, that there are quite different types of questions, e.g. «quis homo currit?», is reason enough to assume an *oratio interrogativa* as a separate subclass of the *oratio perfecta*.

Concluding remarks

The distinction of assertive and non-assertive sentences is far from being simple or trivial. The division of the *oratio* reveals more difficulties than the division of the *propositio*. These difficulties rest upon the mixture of a logical approach with traditional grammatical features. If it is conceded that the treatment of non-assertive sentences belongs to the field of grammar, rhetoric and poetry, one should nevertheless concede that the distinction of assertive and non-assertive sentences itself is of logical relevance. At least

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[28] For the distinction of *questio dialetica* and *questio disciplinalis* cf. L. M. DE RIJK, *Logica Modernorum* II-2 cit., p. 161,6 sqq.

the medieval treatment of the *questio* or *oratio interrogativa* (or *problema*) which overlaps with the *oratio indicativa* implies logical aspects and distinctions. William and Lambert are right in assuming the *oratio interrogativa* as a separate class of the *oratio perfecta*, especially since there are questions which do not coincide with the corresponding categories of *propositiones* or *orationes enuntiative*. In contrast, the non-Boethian types of the *oratio perfecta* in William and Peter are not convincing. Either the given examples do not represent complete sentences, or, if they do so, these sentences are to be subsumed under the indicative sentence, namely the hypothetical proposition. Nuchelmans is right in criticizing confusion of the modes of speech and moods of the verb. But I hesitate to regard this confusion as a relevant cause for an «eventual atrophy of such philosophical inquiry into the nature and classification of kinds of speech as there had been in the past».[29] As far as I can see, in the 13th century we rather meet tendencies of increasing emancipation from the grammatical tradition and a shift towards mere logical issues.

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[29] Cf. text quoted after the note 14.