

**Institut für Philosophie
Seniorprofessur für Theoretische Philosophie
Im Rahmen des Forschungskolloquiums laden wir ein zum Vortrag von**

**Dr. Maria Sekatskaya
(HHU Düsseldorf)**

**Dienstag, 22.11.2022
18:00 – 19:30 Uhr, Raum: 24.53 01.81**

Freedom and Abduction

Abstract: Most accounts of free will either assert that there are metaphysically necessary conditions for free will, which are intuitively evident to us, or claim that free will is a purely psychological phenomenon that does not need any metaphysical grounding. In the talk, I will review the problems of both the aprioristic metaphysical accounts and the psychological accounts. After that, I will offer a new abductive account which attempts to solve these problems. This abductive account is based not only on the intuitions of philosophers but also on the intuitions of the folk, currently being researched by experimental philosophy, and on the social behaviour and organization of human societies in the perspective of cultural evolution. One of the conceptual tasks of this account is the explication of a weak notion of free will that can be considered as “real”, i.e. realized in the human brain and behaviour, by means of an abductive inference to the best explanation.

Speaker: Maria Sekatskaya is a post-doctoral research fellow of the DFG research group Inductive Metaphysics at the institute of philosophy at HHU. Her research interests are in philosophy of mind and metaphysics, with a special emphasis on the problem of free will. Main publications: “Alternative Possibilities and the Meaning of Can” (with Gerhard Schurz), *Dialectica*, (forthcoming); “Free Will, Control, and the Possibility to Do Otherwise from a Causal Modeler’s Perspective” (with Alexander Gebharter and Gerhard Schurz), *Erkenntnis* (2020).

**Dr. Filippo Ferrari
(University of Bologna)**

**Dienstag, 22.11.2022
19:30 – 21:00 Uhr, Raum: 24.53 01.81**

Logic is minimally intrinsically normative

Abstract: Three are the aims of this talk. The first is taxonomical: by relying on some work done by MacFarlane (2004), Steiberger (2018), and Ferrari (2021), I will distinguish between several questions we may ask about the normativity of logic in relation to reasoning. I will then focus primarily on what I call the source question, namely the question about what's the ultimate source of the normative function that logic is taken to exert on reasoning. With this in hand, I'll turn to my second aim which will be to discuss and critically assess some extrinsicist replies to the source question according to which the source of the normative function that logic exerts on reasoning is wholly external to the nature of logic (and the relation of logical consequence). Last, as my third aim, I will briefly and tentatively advance an intrinsicist reply to the source question. I will argue that there is a distinctive albeit minimal kind of logical normativity which is ultimately sourced in the relation of logical consequence itself.

Speaker: Filippo Ferrari is assistant professor of philosophy at the University of Bologna. Filippo has published numerous scientific articles in high-ranked peer-reviewed journals on a variety of topics in both traditional and social epistemology, philosophy of language and philosophy of logic. He has published two books, the latest of which is “Truth and Norms” published with Lexington, and he is the founder and coordinator of the European Network for the Philosophy of Logic (EuPhilo).