Das Team des Projekts “Kognitiv-Rationale Rekonstruktion” lädt ein zum Gastvortrag von Felix Kopecky (Karlsruhe).
Vortragstitel
Some epistemic effects of biased argumentation in artificial societies
Abstract
Empirical studies have revealed a myside bias in human argumentation and deliberation. Regardless of their education, IQ, and mindfulness, humans are more likely to produce arguments in favour of their own case than to support others, and more likely to produce arguments against the beliefs of others than to criticise their own. This myside bias also raises socio-epistemic questions. Does being biased towards our own side affect our ability to reach agreement with others? Does it stand in the way of our quest for the truth? And if so, by how much? In this talk I discuss the prospects of agent-based models from computational philosophy to shed light on these questions. I start with a new look at earlier results from these models in light of bias and humility. Together with new variants of these models, these results suggest that biased argumentation does not necessarily pose epistemic impediments – at least not in argumentation among artificial societies. Biased, artificial agents are likely to reach agreement if their biased arguments take off from a common ground. Truth-tracking abilities, on the other hand, seem to be impeded by biased argumentation among artificial agents. A full understanding of the epistemic effects of biased argumentation in artificial societies can help us generate new hypotheses for empirical testing, and it can also contribute to the discussion about which, if any, interventions we should pursue against biased argumentation in humans.