Timothy Williamson (Oxford): Morally Loaded Cases in Philosophy

Datum / Uhrzeit:
04.12.18   /  18:30 - 20:00

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Timothy Williamson (Oxford): Morally Loaded Cases in Philosophy


Morally loaded examples, e.g. those involving Nazis, are sometimes more convincing than ones you might expect to be more clear-cut based on common sense or science. I’ll illustrate the phenomenon in connection with relativism, scepticism, and internalism in epistemology. But is it legitimate, or a kind of cheating, stirring up emotions to bypass reason? I’ll argue that something subtler is going on.

Zur Person

Timothy Williamson has been the Wykeham Professor of Logic at Oxford since 2000. He was born in Uppsala, Sweden, in 1955. After an undergraduate degree in mathematics and philosophy and a doctorate in philosophy, both at Oxford, he was a lecturer in philosophy at Trinity College Dublin, a fellow and tutor at University College Oxford, and Professor of Logic and Metaphysics at the University of Edinburgh.

He has been a visiting professor at MIT and Princeton, a visiting fellow at the Australian National University and the University of Canterbury (New Zealand), a visiting scholar at the centre for advanced study in Oslo, a Nelson distinguished professor at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, a Townsend Visitor at Berkeley and Tang Chun-I visiting professor at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. 

Timothy Williamson is the author of Identity and Discrimination (Blackwell 1990, updated edition 2013), Vagueness (Routledge 1994), Knowledge and its Limits (Oxford 2000), The Philosophy of Philosophy (Blackwell 2007), Modal Logic as Metaphysics (Oxford 2013), and two books that are accessible to a wider audience: Tetralogue (Oxford 2015) and Doing Philosophy (2018).

Timothy Williamson ist Gast der Forschungsgruppe Inductive Metaphysics.


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