HHU StartPhilosophische FakultätPhilosophyProfessorshipsProf. Dr. Gerhard SchurzDCLPSEventsWorkshop: The Theory-Ladenness of Experience (March 10th - 11th, 2011)

Workshop Title

Description:
The aim of the conference is to bring together philosophers, psychologists and cognitive scientists whose work contributes to our understanding of the scope and limits of theory-ladenness phenomena, where these are broadly construed to include the domains of perception, scientific evidence and language. We hope that the resulting synergy will help provide novel and fruitful answers to questions like the following: Is perception cognitively penetrable and, if so, how? Does the choice of scientific theory affect how we select, interpret and assess the evidential worth of data from experiments? Under what circumstances can we doubt the veridicality of scientific instruments? Can we draw a sharp distinction between terms that are theoretical and those that are observational? We thus expect that the talks will deal with one or more of the following topics: the modularity of mind, nonconceptual content, the epistemology of evidence and the semantics of observational terms.

Date: March 10-11, 2011

Place: Faculty of Philosophy, Building: 23.21, Room: 00.46a

Organizer/s: Gerhard Schurz, Michela Tacca and Ioannis Votsis

Funding: This conference is financed by the DFG (German Research Association).

 

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Schedule

March 10, 2011
09:30–10:30

Allan Franklin (Colorado) undefinedTheory Ladenness and the Epistemology of Experiment (undefinedabstract)

10:30–10:40

coffee break

10:40–11:40

Ioannis Votsis (Duesseldorf) undefinedHow Similarity Unveils the World

11:40–11:50

coffee break

11:50–12:20F.A. Muller (Rotterdam) undefinedA Logical Analysis of Theory-Ladenness
12:20–14:00

lunch break

14:00–15:00Michela Tacca (Duesseldorf) undefinedCognitive Penetrability and the Content of Perception (undefinedabstract)
15:00–15:10coffee break
15:10–15:40Eva Schmidt (Saarlande) undefinedDoes Conceptual Content Have to be Objective? A Defence of Nonconceptualism (undefinedabstract)
15:40–15:50coffee break
15:50–16:50Athanassios Raftopoulos (Cyprus) undefinedTheory Ladenness of Perception, Concepts, and Cognitive Impenetraility of Perception (undefinedabstract)
16:50–17:00coffee break
17:00–18:00William Brewer (Illinois, Urbana-Champaign) undefinedNaturalized Approaches to Theory Ladenness: Evidence from Cognitive Psychology History, and the Ecological Validity Argument (undefinedabstract)
March 11, 2011
09:30–10:30

Martin Kusch (Vienna) undefinedHallucinations and Microscopes: Comments on Bas van Fraassen's Recent Work on Observability  (undefinedabstract)

10:30–10:40

coffee break

10:40–11:40

Gerhard Schurz (Duesseldorf) undefinedOstensive Learnability as Criterion for Theory-Neutral “Observation” Concepts  (undefinedabstract)

11:40–11:50 coffee break
11:50–12:20 Vincent Israel-Jost (IHPST) undefinedEpistemological Consequences of the Problem of Theory-Ladenness of Experience (undefinedabstract)
12:20–14:00 lunch break
14:00–14:30Guillaume Maranda (Bristol) undefinedBegging the Question: A Reason to Worry about Theory-Dependence’ (undefinedabstract)
14:30–14:40coffee break
14:40–15:40Markus Werning (Bochum) undefinedHow alien are concepts to perception? Contrasting the symbolic with the emulative view of concepts. (undefinedabstract)
15:40–15:50coffee break
15:50–16:20 Ellen Fridland (Humboldt)undefinedPerception, Skill and Cognitive Penetrability (undefinedabstract)
16:20–16:30

coffee break

16:30–17:30Robert McCauley (Emory) undefinedMaturationally Natural Cognition and Radically Counter-Intuitive Science (undefinedabstract)
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